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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1323  
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000292

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DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/CC  
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ  
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH

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TAGS: [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [KCRM](#) [KHLS](#) [KPAO](#) [PGOV](#) [PINS](#) [KJUS](#) [KISL](#)

AS, ID

SUBJECT: REQUEST APPROVAL TO TRAIN MOBILE BRIGADE PERSONNEL

REF: A. JAKARTA 00248

- [1](#)B. JAKARTA 00229
- [1](#)C. JAKARTA 00194
- [1](#)D. JAKARTA 00152
- [1](#)E. 06 JAKARTA 003688
- [1](#)F. 03 SECSTATE 310662
- [1](#)G. SECSTATE 5646

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This cable contains an urgent action request (see Para 8).

[1](#)2. (C) Summary: Recent counterterrorism operations by Indonesian National Police (INP) units in Central Sulawesi highlight a deficiency in our approach to police training in Indonesia. Specifically, the 2003 ban on using International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to train INP Mobile Brigade units (Ref F) prevents us from providing a sufficiently broad range of training to the very units most in need of assistance. Mobile Brigade is frequently tasked with handling the most potentially violent situations, such as in Central Sulawesi, where they work closely with INP Counterterrorism (CT) units, which do receive State Department-funded training. Mobile Brigade troops are also the most suitable candidates for the stability police that we seek to train under the COESPU program, to which we have just invited Indonesia (Ref G). Stability police help fill the security gap between military peacekeeping troops and civilian police during a peace operation by performing the following tasks: crowd control, critical infrastructure security, VIP security, patrolling high-risk environments, election security, prison security, and border control/security.

[1](#)3. (C) Summary continued: To meet INP's immediate operational CT needs in Central Sulawesi, where terrorists linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are trying to provoke ethnic violence, and to support U.S. initiatives such as COESPU, Post seeks Washington's approval to use appropriate Department of Defense funding to support U.S. military training of INP Mobile Brigade and INP Detachment 88 units with constructive, table-top, tactical advice and assistance. This training would be specific, need-based, and approved by the Embassy. Furthermore, Post repeats its March 2005 request to end the restriction on INCLE funding (Ref E), to allow us to resume training Mobile Brigade personnel on a

variety of skills and procedures, including INL-funded use-of-force and human rights training. All Post training of INP Mobile Brigade units will occur under the same conditions applied to other INP members and units, including a complete vetting of all personnel and/or units proposed for training. End Summary.

#### TACTICAL MOBILE BRIGADE TRAINING NEEDED FOR CT OPERATIONS

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¶4. (C) Recent counterterrorism operations by INP units in Central Sulawesi have again highlighted the need for joint training of INP tactical units on conducting large scale CT operations. In ongoing CT efforts in the Poso area, INP units, including Mobile Brigade personnel, have conducted cordon-and-search operations and direct assaults of terrorist safehouses in urban areas adjacent to the dense surrounding jungle. During the January 22 police raid on a militant stronghold in Poso, one policeman was killed and several suspected terrorists on Indonesia's most wanted list escaped (Ref C). Communication and coordination difficulties among various INP units may have complicated these large-scale CT operations. In addition to our on-going training and development of INP Detachment 88 counterterrorism units, U.S. support for combined operational training of Detachment 88 and other tactical units the INP often deploys in concert could improve INP CT operations significantly.

¶5. (C) The Indonesian police uses its Mobile Brigade to control the most potentially explosive incidents and areas. These units also defend our diplomatic posts, particularly during demonstrations, and many other prominent and potential targets frequented by Westerners. The USG has committed to help transform the INP into a more professional, competent

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and respected law enforcement organization as it emerges from its status as a stepchild to the military. Our twin capacity building goals in the areas of counterterrorism and human rights would be enhanced if we could train those INP forces charged with the toughest tasks. Mobile Brigade units cannot meet our performance expectations if they cannot be trained up to our standards.

#### ENGAGEMENT VS. ISOLATION

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¶6. (C) While some past actions by INP Mobile Brigade units have deservedly earned them a negative reputation, any constructive impact from our isolating the unit has long since passed. Our 2006 Human Rights Report does not implicate the Mobile Brigade in any human rights violations. Despite this improved track record, the blanket 2003 ban prevents our using INCLE funding to train Mobile Brigade personnel in critical areas -- human rights, use of appropriate force and defense techniques -- all of which our Civil Disturbance Management program has provided to other INP members and units since 2002. This leaves Mobile Brigade personnel ill-equipped to react properly, making them prone to overreact and retaliate with human rights abuses, thereby perpetuating the pattern we seek to break. We need to begin to engage this critical and potentially highly effective INP component in order to professionalize it as we have other units. Any Mobile Brigade leaders or members implicated in past violations would not pass Post vetting procedures, and therefore would not be trained.

#### PROCEED WITHIN THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF LEAHY

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¶7. (C) Absent a response from Washington to our March 2005 request to end the restriction on INCLE funding, Post seeks to commence plans to train Mobile Brigade personnel on a variety of skills and procedures, including use-of-force and human rights. Our use of INCLE funding to conduct training will apply the same standard to Mobile Brigade units and

personnel as it does to the rest of the INP, as has long been the case for those Mobile Brigade members trained in CT skills under the DS/ATA program, as specifically allowed under Department policy (Ref F). This approach will follow the letter and the spirit of the law regarding the training of Indonesian security force members routinely selected for USG-funded training, including careful vetting for human rights violations before training begins.

18. (C) Action Request: By helping build a more capable and professional cadre of Mobile Brigade personnel, we will enhance the INP's ability to maintain civil order consistent with a stable, accountable, and mature democracy and human rights norms. To meet the immediate tactical needs of the INP in conducting critical CT operations in Central Sulawesi, Post needs speedy approval to use appropriate Department of Defense funding to support U.S. military training of INP Mobile Brigade and INP Detachment 88 units with tactical table-top advice and assistance. This training would be specific, need-based, and approved by the Embassy. To meet longer term interest in modernizing the INP, we strongly request lifting Ref F ban on INCLE funded training so that broader-based training can resume.  
PASCOE